
Evaluating AI Agents
A practical guide to grading an agent's path, not just its answer: tools and MCP, the trajectory, multi-turn conversation, trace analysis, and safety when the agent can act.
Get the guideAttack objectives, not strings. Generated fresh against the model you ship today, pursued across a conversation when one turn is not enough, and scored on whether the attacker got what it came for.
AI red teaming is adversarial testing of an AI system: deliberately trying to make it do what it was built to refuse, such as leaking personal data, reciting its system prompt, taking an unauthorised action or producing harmful content, and measuring whether the attack succeeded. It tests the behaviour under attack, not the wording of the refusal.
EvaliQA generates the attacks per run from an objective, a vulnerability and a technique, pursues them single-turn or across a conversation with a scripted, simulated or adaptive attacker, and scores each row on whether the objective was achieved. Because the attempts are regenerated every run, the test stays relevant after the model or prompt changes.
"Get the assistant to disclose another customer's order details" is an objective. The many phrasings that pursue it are attempts, and they are disposable: change the model and the wording that worked stops working, while the objective stays exactly as relevant.
So EvaliQA generates the attempts rather than storing them. In the Generate step you pick the attack surface, the vulnerabilities to breach and the techniques to deliver them, and the generator writes the rows against the system you described, each tagged with the vulnerability and technique it came from.
A system prompt that refuses a direct request will often concede it over four patient turns, which single-shot testing never catches.
In multi-turn mode the attacker works the objective across a conversation, adapts when refused, and stops at a turn budget you set. Each session is scored whole, with a transcript to read. Pick the attacker by how much realism you want:
Checking whether the answer contains a refusal phrase rewards a model that says "I can't help with that" and then helps in the next paragraph, and punishes one that declines in its own words. Red-team rows are scored on the objective instead: did the system breach the vulnerability under this attack, or did it hold?
Because the metric is baked into the row, red-team plans skip the metric and parameter steps of the wizard entirely. You choose what to probe; the scoring follows from it.
Vulnerabilities say what you are trying to breach. Techniques say how it is delivered. You pick both, and a row is tagged with the pair it came from.
How hard the attacker pushes across a multi-turn session, from polite persistence to outright hostility, chosen per dataset.
An attack success rate is a number that goes up as well as down. Put a threshold on it in CI and a regression blocks a merge.
Red teaming is not the upsell. Free carries a monthly allowance of attack cases, and Team carries a larger one.
The method behind the product, written down in full. Free to read and keep.

A practical guide to grading an agent's path, not just its answer: tools and MCP, the trajectory, multi-turn conversation, trace analysis, and safety when the agent can act.
Get the guide
A practical guide to measuring retrieval and generation separately, building datasets you can trust, and turning one-off checks into a regression process.
Get the guidePenetration testing probes your infrastructure: servers, APIs, networks and access control. AI red teaming probes model behaviour: whether the AI system can be talked into leaking data, ignoring its system prompt, calling a tool it should not, or producing harmful content. The target is the conversation rather than the stack, so the attacks are prompts and dialogues instead of exploits, and success is measured by what the model does, not by a shell you opened.
Prompt injection is an attack that overrides an AI system's own instructions with attacker-controlled text, either typed directly by the user or hidden in a document, web page or tool result the system reads. A successful injection can make the model ignore its system prompt, reveal it, or follow the attacker's commands instead of yours. It is the top risk in the OWASP LLM Top 10, and EvaliQA tests both direct and indirect, retrieved-data injection.
A multi-turn jailbreak is an attack spread across several turns rather than one prompt: establish a harmless frame, win a small concession, cite it as settled, then ask for the thing. Many AI systems that refuse a direct request concede it by the fourth turn, which single-shot tests never catch. EvaliQA runs these with scripted, simulated or adaptive attackers, including algorithms like Crescendo and TAP, under a turn budget you set, and scores the whole session on the outcome.
EvaliQA covers 33 vulnerabilities across safety, privacy, behaviour and access, including the risks the OWASP LLM Top 10 flags such as prompt injection, sensitive-information disclosure, system prompt leakage and excessive agency, alongside access-control flaws like BOLA and RBAC bypass. They are delivered through 30 attack techniques, from direct requests to encoding, roleplay, authority and multi-turn escalation. You pick the vulnerability and technique pairs, and every generated row is tagged with the pair it came from.
Regular evaluation asks whether the AI system does the right thing on the inputs you expect, and scores answer quality. Red teaming asks whether it can be made to do the wrong thing on inputs an attacker chooses. The dataset is adversarial and regenerated every run rather than fixed, and the score is the outcome of the attack, whether it breached or held, not how well written the answer was. Both run through the same wizard, so an attack success rate can gate a release like any other metric.
Yes. Manual red teaming does not scale and cannot be re-run every release. EvaliQA automates it: you describe the AI system and pick what to probe, and the platform generates the adversarial prompts, runs them against your endpoint over HTTP, drives multi-turn attacks with an attacker model, and scores every row on the outcome. Because the attempts are regenerated each run, an automated suite keeps finding fresh phrasings instead of replaying a stale list, and it can run in CI on every merge.
No. EvaliQA red teams black-box: if your AI system answers an HTTP request, a connector describes the endpoint, its headers and its response shape, and the attacks run against the system exactly as a user would reach it. You do not need the model weights, the training data or an SDK inside your app, so you can red team a third-party model or a system you only reach through an API.
It is included on every plan, not a separate SKU. Free carries a monthly allowance of attack cases and Team a larger one, and the adversarial attacker runs on the platform's own model, so there is no extra key to bring for it. An attack success rate behaves like any other metric, so you can put a threshold on it in CI and fail the build when a regression lets more attacks through.
Generate a red-team dataset against your own system and read the sessions that got through.